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Abstract
Accounts of the formal semantics of natural language often
adopt a pre-existing framework. Such formalisations rely upon
informal narrative to explain the intended interpretation of an
expression — an expression that may have different interpreta-
tions in different circumstances, and may supports patterns of
behaviour that exceed what is intended. This ought to make
us question the sense in which such formalisations capture our
intuitions about semantic behaviour. In the case of theories
of questions and answers, a question might be interpreted as a
set (of possible propositional answers), or as a function (that
yields a proposition given a term that is intended to be inter-
preted as a phrasal answer), but the formal theory itself pro-
vides no means of distinguishing such sets and functions from
other cases where they are not intended to represent questions,
or their answers. Here we sketch an alternative approach to
formalisation a theory of questions and answers that aims to
be sensitive to such ontological considerations.
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1 Introduction
We first introduce some issues and concerns relating to the semantic
analysis of questions and answers that are raised, or alluded to in
the literature. We then summarise, in broad terms, existing formal
analyses. Here we focus on semantic concerns relating to the analysis
of direct questions and their answers, rather than pragmatic issues,
indirect questions, or the analysis of discourse.
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1.1 Questions
There are various types of questions that can be posed, even dis-
counting implicit or indirect questions. These can be broadly clas-
sified as “wh-questions” — “Who went to London?”, “What was his
name?”, “How did you do that?” — “polarity” questions — “Do you
like cheese?”, and “choice” questions — “Do you want tea or coffee?”.
The latter might be seen as a variant of a polarity question where
there is a forced choice.
Questions can also be embedded in other propositions, for example
in certain kinds of propositional attitudes — “He knows who ate all
the cheese”, “He wonders whether John likes Mary”.
Questions may be refined by an additional question — “Who ate
the cheese, was it John?”, “Who ate the cheese, or was it the pickle?”.1
1.2 Answers
When questions are answered directly, the answer can be presented
as a constituent — Q: “Who went to London?” A: “Peter and
Mary.”/“Nobody.” — or a proposition — A: “Peter and Mary went to
London.”/“Nobody went to London.” Answers may also be indirect,
requiring some reasoning to deduce the intended answer.
Polarity questions can be answer with “yes” or “no”, an adverb
(of an appropriate nature) or a modal expression — Q: “Do you like
cheese?”, A: “Yes”/“Sometimes”. The related proposition may also be
spelt out in full — A: “Yes, I like cheese.”/“I like cheese.”.
Choice offering questions are answer with the respondent’s choice
being identified — Q: “Do you want tea or coffee?”, A: “Tea.”/“I would
like tea, please.”.
Answers are typically incomplete and non-exhaustive. The appro-
priate answers depend upon the context. What counts as a relevant
answer may also depend upon what is assumed to be known.
A question may also be answered with a question — Q: “Who ate
the cheese?”, A: “Who do you think?”/“How should I know?”.2
1This could be viewed as a simple example of extended discourse relating to
a “question under discussion” (Stalnaker, 1978; Roberts, 1996; Ginzburg & Sag,
2000).
2As when clarifying a question with an additional question, this may be an ex-
ample where a more general analysis of the pragmatics of discourse is appropriate.
Axiomatising Questions 3
1.3 Relationship between focus and answers
The topic–focus contrast (see Jackendoff, 1972; Stechow, 1981, for
example) is relevant when considering the interpretations of questions
and answers (Stechow, 1991; Krifka, 2001). The focus of an utterance
may be marked by some form of prosodic emphasis in speech. It
typically draws attention to new information that is being introduced,
or is in question. This is in contrast to the topic, which is taken to be
understood, or presupposed. In the case of written language, we may
use other cues to deduce what is in focus.
Questions provide a diagnostic test for focus: we can determine
what is in focus in a proposition by considering what question the
proposition might answer (Paul, 1880; Rooth, 1992) — “John likes
cheese.” (Q: Who likes cheese? ), “John likes cheese.” (Q: What does
John like? ). Given the nature of these diagnostic tests, it is tempting
to argue that wh-terms in questions correspond to the expected focus
in their answers, and that it may be appropriate to consider them as
either in focus, or at least a place-holder for focus.
Focus, or emphasis, in a question may also clarify what information
is sought in the case of polarity questions. In particular, knowledge
of what is in focus may assist the addressee in identifying helpful
information in the event of a “no” answer — Q: “Did John eat the
cheese?”, A: “No, it was Peter.” (cf. “No, it was the banana.”).3
For wh-questions, focus may emphasise exactly what is in question
(and thus what would constitute an appropriate answer) — “Who ate
the cheese?”, “Who ate the cheese?”, “Who ate the cheese?”.
1.4 Semantic Theories of Questions
Very broadly, the various formal semantic analyses of questions and
their answers can be consider to fall broadly into two camps, namely
questions as sets of answers and questions as structured meanings.4
There are some common issues for both approaches, such as whether
or not questions, answers, and propositions should all be considered
to be essentially the same kind of thing.
3This is rather like a wh-question with a follow-up question (Section 1.1, “Who
ate the cheese, was it John?”). Such similarities merit attention in any compre-
hensive account of questions and answers in dialogue.
4Some seek to bridge this gap (for example, Aloni & Rooy, 2002).
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1.4.1 Questions as sets of answers
On the first approach, questions are conceived as sets of (possible)
answers (Hamblin, 1958, 1973; Karttunen, 1977, and others). Within
the the possible worlds framework, this can be formulated in terms of
partitions of worlds (Groenendijk & Stokhof, 1984, 1997), where each
partition represents a proposition/answer, and true answers are those
partitions that contain the current world.
This approach directly models full, propositional answers. It also
allows for some forms of “indirect” answer. Modelling constituent
answers require a bit more work, for example by combining the con-
stituent answer with an appropriate abstract derived from the ques-
tion to produce a full propositional answer. The analysis of questions
and answerhood is in effect given in the same terms as the notion of
truth for propositions.
Arguably, issues concerning topic–focus, and how they relate to
answers–questions, are not so easily accounted for. There are also
other difficulties concerning “goodness of fit” with the data, including
the the handling of choice-offering questions (Krifka, 2001).
1.4.2 Questions as structured meanings
The structured-meanings account of questions, and answers, can be
motivated by observing that the topic–focus may be analysed in
terms of such structured meanings (Halliday, 1967; Hull, 1975; Tichý,
1978; Stechow, 1982; Stechow & Zimmermann, 1984; Stechow, 1991;
Ginzburg, 1992; Ginzburg & Sag, 2000; Krifka, 1991, 2001; Vallduví,
1992, 1993) in which “old” information is distinguished from “new”
information. If wh-terms are considered to be focus-like, then we
can take a similar approach to questions. The focus of the answer is
corresponds to the “new” information being sought by the question.
Constituent answers are answers in which the topic has been elided.
Structured meanings can be considered as “pairs” for both ques-
tions — where a wh-term is paired with the body of the question
— and for topic–focus structures — where the focus terms is paired
with the topic (cf. Krifka, 2001). The “focus” of an answer can be
thought of as providing a “filler” for the wh-term. There is a sense
in which the wh-term is “abstracted” out of the body of the ques-
tion. In some accounts, a question is overtly represented by a (typed)
λ-abstract, λxT .p, where xT corresponds to the wh-term that is ab-
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stracted from the body of the question, p (cf. Ginzburg & Sag, 2000;
Hausser, 1983; Hausser & Zaefferer, 1979; Stechow & Zimmermann,
1984). Constituent answers (or focus-terms) can then be “applied”
to the question (or fill in the “missing” focus) to give a propositional
answer.
Such an approach can give a straight-forward account of con-
stituent answers, although dealing with propositional answers requires
some additional formal machinery. The structured-meanings account
goes someway towards relating the notion of topic–focus with that of
question–answer. It can also provide accounts of choice offering ques-
tions (Krifka, 2001). Arguments can also be made that it is not as
reductive as the “sets of answers” account.
2 Ontological Issues
There are a number of grounds for evaluating the pros and cons of
different approaches5, including coverage of the data, and sensitivity
to ontological issues. It is the latter that we focus on here.
In the case of set-theoretic accounts (Section 1.4.1), is it right to
reduce all ontological notions to those of sets? Or possible worlds and
relations over possible worlds, construed as sets?
We might consider arguments from Benacerraf (1965) on numbers,
where the critical point is that numbers have structural properties
whose status is independent of any particular set-theoretic characteri-
sation. And different set-theoretic characterisations give rise to differ-
ent unintended consequences — consequences that are not in accord
with our understanding of the notion of number.6 We may wonder
whether semantic notions, such as questions and answers should also
be considered to have structural properties that are independent of a
set-theoretic characterisation (Fox & Turner, 2012).
It seems odd for questions to be their (possible) answers. If that
were the case, then any set of propositions/worlds would be a question.
This gives rise to a methodological conundrum: how can we explore
the relationship between the meaning of a question and its possible
5For example, see Krifka (2001) for criticism of sets of answers approach.
6Some set-theoretic representations allow us to express seemingly incoherent
statements such as “2 ∈ 3”. Whether such a statement is true or false does not
reflect any intuitions about numbers themselves but is merely a contingent artifact
of the chosen representation.
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answers if a question actually is its answers, as assumed by those that
follow Hamblin (1973)? It seems natural to argue that we can consider
questions and their formal properties without being obliged to engage
in some form of ontological reduction, just as we do with numbers.
But a set-theoretic reduction appears to rule this out, at least in the
formalisation.7
Similar arguments apply to accounts that use structured meanings
to represent questions. For example, if structured meanings are pairs,
how are such pairs to be distinguished from other pairs? And if ques-
tions are abstracts, how are such abstracts distinguished from other
abstracts/functions?
For some, such reductions may be considered desirable. For ex-
ample, Tichý (1978); Hamblin (1973); Karttunen (1977), and others,
argue that questions and propositions should be the same type and
that any distinction resides in our relationship to them. But this
does not necessarily avoid the problem. Even if the notion of being
a question is a relational one, then it can still be characterised. And
presumably we wish to characterise it in a way that does not allow it
to be conflated with some other, fundamentally distinct notion.
To summarise: with set-based accounts, any intuitive, ontologi-
cal distinction between questions and answers, and arbitrary sets of
propositions, is lost; and with conventional structured-meaning ac-
counts, the intuitive, ontological distinction between questions (and
answers), pairs, or propositional abstracts, is also lost.8
3 Towards a Non-reductive Analysis
Here we demonstrate a framework in which a non-reductive theory of
questions can be developed. Questions will be treated somewhat like
“specifications” in computer science. Answers will be those things that
may “satisfy” a specification. Full propositional answers are taken to
7It may be possible to defend a set-theoretic reduction, and say that to entertain
a question and its possible answers is to reflect on a membership relationship,
or the extensional identity of a question. But then we risk stumbling into a
version of the paradox of analysis (Black, 1944). We surely want to say that
“considering a question and its answers” means something different to “considering
the membership of a set”.
8We could parody this reduction by observing that there appear to be no
questions or answers in these formal theories of questions and answers.
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have a focus that satisfies the specification. Polarity questions will be
treated as questions that are answered by a propositional operator of
some kind (modal or adverbial).
For our current purpose, it is not essential for us to spell out all
the details here; the key objective is to demonstrate that no ontologi-
cal reduction is required in order for us to develop a formal semantic
analysis. We will illustrate this approach using Typed Predicate Logic
(TPL), a generic framework of types and predicate logic (Turner, 2008,
2009), described below (Section 3.1). TPL frees us from the formal
constraints and ontological commitments of other more rigid frame-
works. In particular, it allows us to incorporate aspects of the intended
interpretation into the formalisation itself, in the form of judgements
and types. Some of the details of the formalisation follows the spirit
of the structured-meaning approach to questions (Section 1.4.2).9
3.1 Typed Predicate Logic (TPL)
Typed Predicate Logic is a framework in which various kinds of the-
ories can be formulated, both their “syntax” and proof theory. There
are four basic judgements.
t Type t is a type
s : t s belongs to type t
t Prop t is a proposition
t (or t True) t is true
Theories can be formulated in this system using sequent style rules.
We use a context (Γ) to simplify the presentation of rules that in-
volve discharged assumptions. Formation rules are used to specify
the grammar of a theory. For example, we can give the formation
rules for conjunction and negation in a propositional logic.
Γ ` s Prop Γ ` t Prop
Γ ` (s ∧ t) Prop ∧
F
Γ ` t Prop
Γ ` ¬ t Prop ¬F
9The structured-meanings perspective seems better suited to our aim of avoid-
ing ontological reductions. It may be possible to give a non-reductive account
based on some of the insights of the set-theoretic approach. We could seek to define
an answerhood relation that correspond to an answer “belonging to” a question.
We might hope that this would turn out to be consistent with a non-reductive
theory that takes structured meanings as a starting point.
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Rules governing the “logical” behaviour of such expressions can be
given in terms of judgements of truth. These are formulated with
constraints that ensure they only apply to the appropriate kinds of
entities. We can exemplify this with introduction and elimination
rules for conjunction and negation of propositions.
Γ ` s Prop Γ ` t Prop Γ ` s Γ ` t
Γ ` s ∧ t ∧+
Γ ` s Prop Γ, s ` ⊥
Γ ` ¬ s ¬+
Γ ` s Prop Γ ` Prop Γ ` s ∧ t
Γ ` s ∧−
Γ ` s Prop Γ,¬ s ` ⊥
Γ ` s ¬−
For many systems, the formation rules — which generate the well-
formed expressions, including propositions — are independent of the
rules governing other kinds of judgements. Such systems include those
for which meaning-independent notion of syntax can be specified. But
TPL also allows us to express formation rules that depend upon truth
judgements, rather than on purely “syntactic” notions. We can exem-
plify this with a weak form of material implication, that only forms a
proposition if the antecedent is true.
Γ ` s Prop Γ, s True ` t Prop
Γ, s True ` (s→ t) Prop →
′F
TPL allows us to define various type systems. As an example, we
can present a version of Simple Type Theory (Church, 1940), with
entities e, propositions p, and functions 〈S, T 〉 from S to T .
Γ ` e Type Γ ` p Type
Γ ` S Type Γ ` T Type
Γ ` 〈S, T 〉 Type 〈·, ·〉
F Γ ` f : 〈S, T 〉 Γ ` a : S
Γ ` fa : T ◦
More complex types (and data structures) can be defined.
3.2 Questions and Answers in Typed Predicate Logic
We can represent questions using expressions of the form [x : T | φ].
This is reminiscent of the notation of “schema” in computer science.
The type T indicates what type of term answer is appropriate. The
proposition φmust be satisfied by any constituent answer that satisfies
the specification. This can be a distinct representation for questions
— no ontological reduction is required.10
10Polymorphic typing can be used to account for the systematic behaviour of
embedded interrogatives of distinct types (cf. Fox & Lappin, 2005, chapter 5).
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Γ ` T Type
Quest(T ) Type
Quest(T )F
Γ ` T Type Γ, x : T ` φ Prop
Γ ` [x : T | φ] : Quest(T ) [· | ·]
F
For answers, we adopt a form of structured proposition. We can
represent structured propositions as 〈f | t〉, with a topic t and focus
f . This can be kept distinct from the notion of a pair.
Γ, x : T ` t(x) Prop Γ ` f : T
Γ ` 〈f | t〉 Prop 〈· | ·〉
F
Γ, f : T ` t(f) Prop Γ ` a : T Γ ` t(f)
Γ ` 〈f | t〉 〈· | ·〉
+
Γ, f : T ` t(f) Prop Γ ` f : T Γ ` 〈f | t〉
Γ ` t(f) 〈· | ·〉
−
We can now introduce a relation, ans, that makes a well formed
proposition between question and putative answer if they are of the
appropriate nature. The judgement that a is a potential answer to
a question q is then captured by the well-formedness judgement of
a ans q — that is (a ans q) Prop.
Γ, x : T ` t Prop Γ ` a : T
Γ ` (〈a | λx.t〉 ans [x : T | t]) Prop ans
F
This is the canonical propositional case. It would need to be gen-
eralised to include cases where the propositional part of the answer
is “congruent” with the question, or is left unstated. If we have no
analysis of ellipsis, this latter case could be approximated by allowing
the topic in the answer to be optional.
If a is a potential answer to a question q, then we can derive well-
formedness judgement, (a ans q) Prop. For it to be a true (or correct)
answer, we need to be able to derive the judgement (a ans q) True (cf.
Karttunen, 1977).
Γ, x : T ` t Prop Γ ` a : T Γ ` t[x/a]
Γ ` (〈a |[λx.t]〉 ans [x : T | t]) True ans
+
Γ, x : T ` t Prop Γ ` a : T Γ ` (〈a |[λx.t]〉 ans [x : T | t]) True
Γ ` t[x/a] ans
−
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It is worth observing that this framework also allows us capture
fine-grained intentionality without possible worlds. Questions that
have the same (possible) answers need not be equated. This is in part
because we maintain an ontological distinction between questions and
their (possible) answers.11
4 Summary
The claim being made here is not that it is possible or appropriate
to dispense with all of the meta-theoretic narrative that accompanies
any well-constructed formal semantic analysis. Rather, the argument
is that those aspects of the narrative that seek to apply ontological
classifications and distinctions ought to feature in the formal analysis,
and that they can do so given an appropriate formalism. This avoids
conflating the interpretations and patterns of behaviour of expressions
that can result from reducing all formal meaning to the language of
set theory and simple types.
In particular, the formal theory sketched here (Section 3.2) illus-
trates that the notions of “being a question”, and of “being an answer to
a question”, can be captured as first-class judgements within a formal
analysis. It does not prohibit us from making ontological reductions if
we choose. For example, (structured) propositions and questions could
be given the same term representation, or the topic–focus structure
could be expressed in terms of a type-membership judgement.
We can avoid conflating the interpretations and patterns of be-
haviour of expressions that can result from reducing all formal mean-
ing to the language of set theory and simple types. If ontological
reductions are to be made, it should through choice, not because they
are imposed by the limitations of a particular semantic framework, or
methodology.
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